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ABSTRACT
DISCOURSE, MEANING-MAKING, AND EMOTION: THE PRESSURE TO HAVE A
“FEMINIST ABORTION EXPERIENCE”
MAY 2019
DEREK P. SIEGEL, B.A., AMERICAN UNIVERSITY
M.A., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor Amy Schalet
During interviews with self-identified feminists (n=27), respondents express discomfort
when their abortion experiences fail to match perceived expectations from the pro-choice
movement. They describe a “feminist abortion experience” as eliciting a sense of relief,
empowerment, and detachment. An “anti-feminist abortion,” on the other hand, involves
sadness, ambivalence, and a high attachment to the pregnancy. Respondents not only
self-police this boundary but also perform emotion work to change an undesirable
emotional state. First, I ask how pro-choice norms and constructed and perpetuated? I
find that people learn what is expected of them from the contents of pro-choice discourse
and learn about undesirable emotions from their absence in pro-choice discourse. Second,
I ask how feminists manage discrepancies between these perceived expectations (how
they believe they “should” feel) and their actual experiences. In particular, what
motivates them to change their feeling states in the event of such a discrepancy?
Extending Arlie Hochschild’s feeling rules framework (1979), I argue that because of
respondents’ personal and collective identities as feminists, they feel obligated to other
people in the movement to have the “right kind of abortion.” Whereas the feeling rules
framework suggests that people perform emotion work to achieve an ideal feeling state, I
argue that they also work to avoid stigmatized emotions. Lastly, I hypothesize that
iii

personal and collective identities might also explain emotion work in other social
movement contexts. When a movement politicizes and promotes certain emotions,
members will feel obligated to match these norms.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Due to the polarizing nature of abortion in the United States, pregnant people1
face heightened scrutiny before, during, and after their abortions. Even their most
personal experiences have become a site of political contestation; for example, pro-life
activists argue that abortion elicits regret, and thus it is unsafe and should be banned
(Siegel 2008; Kelly 2014), whereas pro-choice activists argue that most people feel
relieved after their abortions (Ludlow 2008; Weitz, Moore, Gordon, and Adler 2008). I
am interested in how pregnant people navigate these powerful emotional expectations.
Specifically, I show how group context shapes abortion experience and how ideological
norms can produce more stress around an often, already fraught situation. Because of my
focus on feminist-identified people, I also examine how membership in a social
movement mediates the way somebody processes and evaluates their emotions.
I did not set out to study feminist-identified individuals or the practice of emotion
management, but in my first wave of interviews (n=20), I was struck by respondents’
perception that certain abortion-related emotions (such as relief, empowerment, and
detachment from the pregnancy) are normal and more desirable than others. At that point,
two questions drove me back into the field to collect more interviews (n=7). First, I
wanted to learn about how these norms are constructed and perpetuated. In other words,
how do feminists come to experience them as real? Second, how do feminists manage
discrepancies between these perceived expectations and their own abortion experiences?
1

Given the fact that not all people who get abortions are women (including transgender men and
gender non-conforming individuals), I use the term “pregnant people” over “pregnant women” or
“women,” when discussing this general population (Midwives Alliance of North America). My
sample contains three genderqueer participants, who do not identify as men or women.
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My respondents report that pro-choice discourse normalizes various emotions, but
they also discuss how the absence of other emotions—such as sadness or ambivalence—
from pro-choice discourse can stigmatize these aspects of their experience. Not only are
feminists aware of the “right” and “wrong” way to have an abortion, but they also put a
lot of work into negotiating this perceived boundary. I wanted to understand why the
failure to conform to perceived expectations would motivate someone to minimize or
alter their “negative feelings.” I found that my respondents self-police their emotions for
several reasons. On one hand, they wanted to avoid being labeled a “bad feminist.” On
the other hand, due to the precarious state of abortion access in the U.S., they feared that
their negative emotions would be used to restrict abortion access for other people.
To understand how feminists manage these perceived abortion-related
expectations, I extend Arlie Hochschild’s feeling rules framework (1979) in two different
ways. Whereas the feeling rules framework argues that people compare themselves
against a desirable norm, I use the concept of stigma to show how respondents also
compare themselves against undesirable categories they wish to avoid, developing a
framework that I call “emotional hierarchies.” I use the concepts of personal and
collective identity to explain what motivates feminists to self-police their emotional state.
Whereas Hochschild attributes emotion work to a sense of obligation in private
relationships (what we “owe’ our loved ones) or on the labor market (what we “owe” our
customers), I argue that respondents are motivated both by the desire to manage their
feminist identities as well as a sense of collective obligation to the pro-choice movement.
Because emotional hierarchies exist in other political contexts, my findings are
not limited to this case. Social movement identification and participation might predict,
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for example, how people articulate their memory of childhood sexual assault (Whittier
2001) or how they navigate public mourning during the AIDS crisis (Gould 2008). When
movements politicize personal experience, people who already feel indebted to their
communities regulate their behavior in the interest of the group. Over the years, social
movement scholars have demonstrated the role of perceived obligation in rallying
individuals to join a cause (Polletta & Jasper 2001). I argue that the experience of
collective identification—and its perceived obligations—also impacts people’s social and
emotional lives outside the movement context. It is important that we not underestimate
group-level membership as a determinant of even people’s most personal experiences.

3

CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW
Abortion, Emotion, and Pro-Choice Discourse
While abortion discourses vary across time and are contested even within social
movements, in the United States today two dominant perspectives prevail. Ferree,
Gamson, Gerhards, and Rucht (2002) find that pro-choice discourses overwhelmingly
describe abortion as a gender-based right (24%) or as a private matter between someone
and their doctor (51%), whereas pro-life discourses frame abortion as murder (48%)2.
In order to combat anti-abortion stigma, feminists attempt to “normalize” abortion
through practices like the 1 in 3 Campaign, a storytelling project based on the statistic
that one in three cisgender women get an abortion in their lifetime (Jones & Kavanaugh
2014). Through their constant repetition, these discourses produce a “powerful set of
expectations that burden [pregnant people’s] feelings leading up to and after their
abortions,” (Millar 2017).
Neither pro-choice nor pro-life discourse, however, fully capture the complexity
of most people’s actual abortion experiences (Keys 2010; Kimport 2012; Millar 2017).
On one hand, pro-choice activists suggest that upon completing their abortion, most
people feel relieved and empowered, with little or no attachment to the pregnancy
(Ludlow 2008; Weitz, Moore, Gordon & Adler 2008). Pro-life activists, on the other
hand, argue that people always feel attached to their pregnancies, and thus experience

2

These numbers are based on a review of over 18,000 passages from the New York Times and
Los Angeles Times.
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degrees of guilt and regret after their abortion (Siegel 2008; Kelly 2014)3. Less formal
abortion talk can also reinforce which emotions are considered “normal” or “desirable.”
For example, Mallary Allen (2014) observes how users on pro-choice message boards
consistently invoke themes such as certainty and empowerment. Since these message
boards are public, Allen argues that users strategically position themselves within certain
“sympathetic” formula stories. But if pro-choice discourse teaches feminists what they
should feel, how do they learn what emotions to avoid? And what occurs when
someone’s experience deviates from these emotional norms?
Scholars who study the relationship between discourse and abortion experiences
draw heavily on the sociology of emotion, particularly Arlie Hochschild’s feeling rules
framework (1979). Feeling rules dictate the proper emotion for a given situation,
including the extent, direction, and duration of this response. “[They] are the side of
ideology that deal with emotions,” Hochschild (1979) explains, so “when an individual
changes an ideological stance, [they] drop old rules and assume new ones.” People
measure their experiences against a perceived norm, becoming aware of any “discrepancy
between what one does feel and what one wants to feel,” (Hochschild 1979). When
facing an emotional mismatch, they will then perform emotion work or emotion
management (both terms refer to the same process) in order to resolve this tension. In the
context of abortion, feeling rules “do not automatically produce the desired emotion
state,” but rather pregnant people engage in different forms of emotion work to “achieve
a feeling state that is [most] consistent with their ideology,” (Keys 2010).

3

Drawing on various psychological literatures, Kimport (2012) argues that regret is not an
emotion but a cognitive evaluation. Therefore, it is not a “feeling rule” per say but a prescribed
way to think about and reflect on your own experience.
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In her research, Hochschild examines how and why the failure to meet a feeling
rule motivates someone to engage in emotion work. In other words, what makes someone
so discontent with a mismatch between ideology and experience that it drives them to
change their emotional state? Hochschild argues that emotion work involves social
exchange. In private relationships one feels they “owe” their loved ones an emotional
debt and on the labor market, in order to keep their jobs, service workers feel they have
an obligation to please their customers (1983). For example, flight attendants are
expected to “disguise fatigue and irritation” by forcing a smile or communicating a “more
appropriate” emotion.
Yet why would my respondents perform emotion work in a situation where
neither their relationships nor their employment status are threatened? While Jennifer
Keys (2010) provides a thorough review of how individuals manage the gap between
abortion ideology and experience4, abortion scholars do not address why pregnant people
might feel compelled to resolve this tension in the first place. Hochschild’s feeling rules
framework is definitely one piece of the puzzle, but in order to fully understand what
motivates respondents’ emotion work, we must incorporate other theoretical approaches.

Stigma and Hierarchies of Experience
Because “normal” and “abnormal” are co-constructed categories, the very
presence of an emotional norm suggests an undesirable or stigmatized counterpart.
According to Goffman (1963), stigma occurs when someone has or is perceived to have

4

Some strategies include suppressing inconsistent emotions, avoiding situational triggers, rituals
and substance use, as well as reinterpreting one’s experience through a different lens.
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an attribute that deviates from a social norm. Stigma involves a drop in social status or
prestige, which can result in negative social, psychological, and even financial outcomes.
Sexuality scholars, however, argue that deviant behaviors do not necessarily stigmatize
social actors, and that stigma and labeling are two distinct processes. For example,
although homosexuality itself carried stigma in the 19th and early 20th centuries, the law
and religion treated it as a behavior rather than an identity. One could repent the sin or
accept a punishment without carrying the stigma as an individual (Plummer 1981).
When we normalize some behavior and stigmatize others, we end up constructing
and reinforcing hierarchies of experience. In Gayle Rubin’s analysis of sex hierarchies
(1994), she observes an unequal distribution of value among behaviors. According to
Rubin, certain sex acts—such as coupled, vanilla, and/or monogamous sex—belong to a
“charmed circle” because they are seen as normal and natural, whereas pathologized acts
such as group, kinky, and/or casual sex occupy the “outer limits” of the model. People
perceive a boundary between “good and bad sex,” and if broken, fear this will produce
“sexual chaos,” which explains why social actors invest so deeply in this boundary.
Borrowing the concept of sex hierarchies, I argue that pro-choice feminists
construct a similar hierarchy of abortion experiences when they normalize the expression
of certain emotions and stigmatize others. Stigma, in fact, is key in understanding both
how the pro-choice movement produces emotional norms and how individuals negotiate
these expectations. Just as individuals compare themselves against pro-choice feeling
rules, they also assess their own and other people’s experiences vis a vis perceived
emotional hierarchies. According to Hanschmidt et al. (2016), abortion stigma contains
three sub-categories: perceived (“awareness of the devaluing attitudes of others,”),
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internalized (“when a [person] incorporates devaluing social norms into [their] selfimage,”), and enacted (“actual experiences of discrimination,”). This paper involves
primarily the first two sub-categories, and also departs from most literature on abortion
stigma, which tends to conflate abortion-related stigma and anti-abortion sentiments
(Kumar et al. 2009). As Keys (2010) asserts, people tend to internalize messages that
align with their ideological worldview, so to understand how feminists navigate
emotional expectations around abortion, we must also consider their political identities.

Navigating Collective & Personal Identities in Social Movements
In the social movements literature, collective identity refers to the “shared sense
of one-ness or we-ness….real or imagined…among those who comprise [a] collectivity,”
(Snow 2001). For some authors, Polletta & Jasper (2001) argue, collective identity “is
shorthand for the affective connections one has to members of a group that oblige one to
protest with or on behalf of them.” Common characteristics of collective identity include
shared definitions, boundaries between in-group and out-group, group consciousness, and
negotiation among members (Melucci 1995; Taylor & Whittier 1992). Personal
identities—or the meanings someone attributes to themselves—differ from collective
identities but may also overlap in meaningful ways (Snow 2001; Polletta & Jasper 2001).
Among my respondents, “feminist” constitutes both a personal and collective identity.
In recent years, social movement scholars who had previously explained political
participation in terms of self-interest or class-consciousness (Fireman & Gamson 1979;
Hunt & Benford 2004) have turned to collective identity because it “better captures the
pleasures and obligations that actually persuade people to mobilize,” (Polletta & Jasper
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2001). Some scholars believe that collective identity does not function well at the
movement level due to vast internal variation (Saunders 2008). Others argue that because
meanings “are constantly changing rather than static,” that collective identities can exist
even in heterogeneous feminist movements (Whittier 1995; Rupp & Taylor 1999). In
fact, Whittier (2001) argues that individuals “make sense of and reconstruct emotions
collectively through movement practices.” Given that individuals possess multiple
personal and collective identities, Snow and McAdam (2000) signal the potential for
conflict or incongruence. When identities converge, “an extant collectivity provides a
venue for an individual to act in accordance with his or her personal identity…[but] in the
absence of correspondence between personal and collective identities, some variety of
identity work is necessary in order to facilitate their alignment.”
In this paper I explore the overlap between emotion work and identity work when
pregnant people’s abortion experiences differ from pro-choice feeling rules. I also argue
that the sense of mutual obligation associated with collective identity shapes the way that
people negotiate their abortion-related emotions. Although individuals claim a multitude
of identities, political membership is particularly salient in determining which movement
discourses someone consumes and internalizes. These movement discourses, and the way
that individuals reproduce this discourse, set the parameters for what responsibilities
group membership entails. I believe this study will address a crucial gap in the social
movements literature, because while some scholars study the production and
management of feeling rules, we know little about how someone’s attachment to a
movement mediates the process of emotion management.

9

CHAPTER 3
METHODS
Entering the field, I wanted to learn more about how people make meaning out of
their abortion experiences. This question emerged from my background as an abortion
counselor, offering emotional support and helping low-income callers acquire funding to
terminate their pregnancies5. Noticing that people’s abortion experiences were almost
always more nuanced than either pro-choice or pro-life discourses suggest, I decided to
interview pregnant people about their recent abortions. In the course of this initial
research, I re-framed my research to focus on respondents’ perceived expectations from
the pro-choice movement about what an abortion should feel like. I wanted to know how
these particular expectations are constructed and maintained, and how respondents
manage discrepancies between these expectations and their own experiences. More
specifically, some respondents expressed profound discomfort if they deviated from these
perceived norms, and I wanted to understand this reaction. With a new focus, in the
second round of interviews, I decided to speak with more people who were both involved
in the pro-choice movement and have had recent abortions. Below I detail the specifics of
the iterative process of question formation, data collection, and question reformulation.
I conducted the first round of interviews from August 2017 – January 2018
(n=20), restricting eligibility to individuals over the age of 18 whose abortions occurred
within the past five years. I was interested in the range and complexity of people’s
abortion experiences, particularly in how they make meaning out of the process. The bulk
of each interview revolved around a reflection exercise where I asked respondents to
5

Due to the 1977 Hyde Amendment, no federal funds in the United States can go towards
abortion, meaning that Medicaid does not cover abortion in 34 states. The average first-trimester
abortion costs $470 (Jones and Koostra 2011).
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describe what they were thinking, how they were feeling physically, and how they felt
emotionally before, during, and after their most recent abortions. Each intensive, semistructured interview lasted between 50-120 minutes. Because people typically share
abortion stories in small, private settings, I found that the intimate nature of a semistructured interview closely mirrors how people typically share their abortion stories6.
Each respondent consented to our conversation being voice-recorded and upon
completion received a $20 gift card to a major retailer. They also selected a pseudonym.
My recruitment process involved two approaches, both of which allowed potential
respondents to self-select into the study. First, I contacted around 50 community centers
and organizations in two Northeastern U.S. cities, both with high availability of clinics
and relatively low barriers to abortion access per state laws. I requested that these
organization share my call for participants with their membership and about half of them
responded to my request; 19 groups agreed to distribute my flyer, mostly student groups
and feminist organizations. From there, I used a respondent-driven sampling method,
asking participants to share word of my study and my contact information with their
networks. Overall, 32 people reached out to inquire about my study, five of whom did not
meet the eligibility requirements and seven who ultimately did not schedule an interview.
Using NVIVO, I coded responses based on how someone “framed” their abortion
experience: as a routine medical procedure, an opportunity for growth, an emotional
burden, and a form of loss. I arrived at these frames inductively, and while there were
others, none showed up as consistently as these four did. Most people mobilized multiple
frames, which often co-existed without conflict but sometimes were experienced as
6

Eliasoph and Lichterman make a similar claim in defense of Ann Swidler’s “Talk of Love,”
explaining the similarities between the interview setting and how people usually discuss matters
of love and intimacy (2003).
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contradictory. In particular, I was struck by the degree to which respondents grappled
with perceived expectations (from the pro-choice movement) about abortion-related
emotions. Based on this finding, I wondered how these expectations are constructed and
how feminists react when their experiences fail to match these perceived norms.
I decided to go back into the field, conducting more interviews (n=7), specifically
with pro-choice activists who had recently terminated a pregnancy. In addition to
questions from the first round, I asked respondents to reflect on feminist messages about
abortion, which of these messages resonated with their experience, and how these
messages are communicated. I conducted this second round of interviews in July 2018,
advertising this time exclusively with pro-choice organizations that shared my call for
participants on social media. Having introduced the option of a video rather than inperson interview, participants in this round reside in various parts of the country. Perhaps
due to existing networks of reproductive justice activists, all out-of-state respondents also
resided in states with relatively high access to abortion, and I did not notice any
difference in the quality of these interviews. I concluded this round when I noticed that
the data had reached saturation.
Table 1. Demographic Information

12

Of the 27 people I interviewed, 18 specifically identified as part of the pro-choice
or reproductive justice movements. Five more self-identified as feminists or discussed
their intent to become more involved in the movement. The remaining four mobilized
popular feminist slogans (such as, “my body, my choice”) but did not explicitly selfidentity. My sample includes both cisgender women and genderqueer individuals (who
use they/them pronouns), most of whom were highly educated and from a middle-class
household across a range of racial and ethnic backgrounds. With the exception of one
respondent who terminated at 14 weeks and another at 21 weeks of pregnancy, the rest
had first trimester abortions (<13 weeks). 14 respondents opted for the in-clinic vacuum
aspiration abortion, ten had the mifepristone/misoprostol combination at the clinic,
otherwise known as the “abortion pill,” and three respondents acquired misoprostol
outside the clinical context, two by preference and one because her country of residence
(at the time of termination) did not offer legal abortion services. Finally, the
overwhelming number of atheist or agnostic respondents in my sample likely have
encountered less pro-life messages in the absence of religious backgrounds. In other
words, my findings do not necessarily reflect the general population but rather
individuals who affiliate with feminist movements and who, more specifically, consume
pro-choice media and internalize pro-choice messages about abortion.

Positionality
I approach this topic with an extensive background in abortion financial and
counseling hotlines. These last few years, I have spoken with several thousand
individuals before or after termination from all over the U.S. and Canada. Anticipating
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concerns about my political motivations and gender presentation7, I chose to disclose on
my recruitment materials that I work for “local and national abortion rights
organizations,” to establish a sense of trust and legitimacy. Because I am studying how
feminist-identified people negotiate pro-choice messages, I am less concerned, in this
particular study, about whether this choice alienated a more diverse ideological sample.
While people always present themselves in consideration of potential reference
groups, by disclosing my professional background I may have further skewed responses
toward what someone thought I might want to hear. This disclosure helped establish
quick rapport with respondents. As I became interested in how feminists hold each other
accountable for having a certain kind of abortion, I saw how disclosing my professional
background in some ways mimics this social process. If respondents perceive us as two
feminists discussing their abortion experience, then this transforms the interview itself
into a useful source of data that I analyze in greater depth below.

7

Because my name and gender expression are typically read as male, at odds with a cultural
understanding of abortion as a “women’s issue,” I inferred that this would be another point of
concern. Indeed, each participant asked about my “interest in the subject,” and several explicitly
cite my gender as the reason for their inquiry
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CHAPTER 4
FINDINGS
“I just wanted the abortion story where a woman feels liberated afterwards”: The
Makings of a Feminist and Anti-feminist Abortion Experience
Respondents describe the pro-choice movement itself as an important source of
education about how they are supposed to feel about their abortion. The messages they
see and hear in the media reinforce the idea that abortion should elicit particular
emotions, such as relief or empowerment. “I’ve seen a bunch of Facebook articles or little
cartoons where a woman gets an abortion and that’s it,” Lucy explains, “there’s little
emotional nuance.” Andi discusses her experience reading pro-choice message boards
before her abortion: “For the most part, they were all very positive. People talk about
how their abortions let them continue with school or their careers.” Like Andi, Rania
researches abortion online to see what she should expect from her own. “All of the
websites said you were supposed to feel relief after your abortion,” Rania says, “You
were supposed to feel relieved that it was over with.”
This portrayal of abortion and abortion-related emotions creates a standard by
which interviewees judge their own experience. Rania says, for instance: “I waited and
waited to feel that relief but it never came. I mostly felt empty and irritable.” Lucy also
expected and aspired to the emotions that she knew she was supposed to feel. Lucy did
not initially feel attached to her pregnancy. “This isn’t really a big deal,” she remembers
thinking, “I don’t feel sad.” Looking back at the experience and recognizing her limited
support system at the time, Lucy now sees this reaction as somewhat strategic: “I don’t
think I could process it all at once. I couldn’t deal with what was happening so I cut
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myself off emotionally. I didn’t want to feel attached.” According to Lucy, her ideal
abortion experience would not have involved emotional ambiguity or a sense of loss. “I
just wanted the abortion story where a woman feels liberated afterwards. She just goes
back to her business career and I wanted it to be that simple.”
Some interviewees feel affirmed by pro-choice discourse that normalizes the
abortion process. “I like that there are people writing about the fact that it’s not a hard
choice for everybody and not everybody feels conflicted about it afterwards,” Julie tells
me, “I’m glad that people are [admitting that] sometimes [the decision is] really clear.”
Sam feels similarly. “Looking back, and it’s been about a year and a half since my
abortion, it feels like a normal part of my life,” Sam says, “Abortion can seem like this
big mystery, so I like to make a point that it’s a normal thing that happens to a lot of
people.” For individuals like Julie and Sam, pro-choice discourses resonate with and
affirm their own experiences
For the vast majority of the people I interviewed, however, the normalizing
discourse of abortion in pro-choice circles can feel constraining. In other words,
respondents feel that they are not supposed to have strong, negative, or complicated
emotions. “You’re not allowed to grieve. You’re not allowed to feel complicated about
having an abortion,” Nicole says, summarizing feminist messages about abortion that
they have heard. “And it’s not necessarily [communicated through] what’s being said, but
it’s in what’s not being said.” As a reproductive justice and indigenous rights activist,
Nicole remarks: “I’ve never seen people being given the space and compassion to just sit
with the complicated feelings they may have around abortion.” They continue: “We talk
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about mental health and anxiety and depression in social justice circles, but it doesn’t feel
acceptable to talk about these things in relation to abortion.”
Maria illustrates the disconnect between movement discourse and the narrow set
of emotions it legitimates, on the one hand, and lived experience on the other. After her
second abortion she felt angry with her partner over his absence and that he did not
understand the extent of her grief and other emotions, “he was like this external living,
walking connection to that pregnancy, to that energy, or whatever.” Around this time, the
Shout Your Abortion twitter campaign began, which aimed to challenge abortion stigma
in the wake of a congressional push to defund Planned Parenthood. “I was super excited
[about the campaign],” Maria says, “But at the end of the day it wasn’t the full picture for
me, and I was suppressing the more emotional connection. I felt mad love for my
pregnancies and a lot of reproductive justice spaces don’t make room for that part of my
experience.” Her impulse to suppress these other emotions, unrepresented in the Shout
Your Abortion campaign, suggests their perceived lack of value.
The content (and absence) of pro-choice discourse do not merely appear to
endorse the expression of certain emotions and stigmatize others. They create, I argue, a
hierarchy of abortion experiences that differentiates between “feminist” and “antifeminist” emotions: relief and empowerment are perceived as normal or “feminist”
responses to abortion, whereas, emotions like ambiguity and grief occupy an unnatural or
“anti-feminist” category. This hierarchy impacts how pregnant people interpret and
manage their own emotions. Valerie, for instance, invokes the normativity and
desirability of certain abortion experiences over others. “I felt sad,” she says, “and I know
it’s crazy. I don’t even want to say it [out loud], but I felt like I was losing my baby. I’m
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sure it was a fetus at that point, but I started reading, being very cliché – I don’t want to
be cliché – I read that at this week the baby develops fingernails and eyes.” One
interpretation is that Valerie uses words like “crazy” and “cliché” to describe her
attachment to the pregnancy because such attachments do not exist within the rubric of
pro-choice discourse. Perhaps Valerie dismisses her sadness when she has no viable
models with which she can reconcile these feelings with other feminist experiences.
Dylan also perceives there to be stigma attached to certain abortion-related
emotions. They seem uncomfortable with how they feel four years after their abortion: “I
still feel a bit of shame, which I hate to admit. But I do…I’m embarrassed by the fact that
I [feel ashamed].” They describe the ambivalence they feel when seeing pro-life
billboards driving down the highway. One read, “Aren’t you glad that your mom chose
life?” Dylan scoffs, “It makes me feel like I chose death when I should be feeling that I
chose not to bring someone into this world in the shitty condition that it’s in.” From one
perspective, it appears that Dylan grapples with both pro-choice and pro-life messages
about abortion—neither adequately affirms their experience. But it is also worth noting
that Dylan would have preferred to feel relief after their abortion, indeed believes they
“should have” felt relief. Dylan feels ashamed for overstepping the perceived boundary
of what feminists deem desirable or normal reactions to abortion.
Interpersonal exchanges reinforce the categories of feminist and anti-feminist
abortion experiences. Through such interactions, people normalize certain abortion
stories and appear to stigmatize others. For example, while working at a women’s center
on her college campus, Valerie received multiple messages about the “right way” to
terminate. On one hand, her boss and coworkers understood abortion as an empowering
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experience and expected Valerie to feel the same way. When Valerie, a Black woman,
disclosed her abortion to her white coworkers, they “acted very excited, like it was a
badge of feminism.” Her coworkers also implied that abortion was an easy decision or a
routine practice: “It was very like, “so you’re getting an abortion.” Like that’s the logical
next step and getting an abortion is easy and unchallenging because I’m a feminist.”
Valerie reflects further on this expectation of emotional detachment, “[they see abortion]
as something passive. Like if you’re pregnant then it is just a box you check off.”
I am not suggesting that feminists maliciously thrust their worldview onto others.
Rather, in the process of comforting a friend, someone may reinforce expectations,
particularly when they lack personal experience of abortion. After all, in their ubiquity,
pro-choice platitudes may be the most available tool at their disposal. For Andi, while
comfortable now, at the time of her abortion she regretted not knowing more about her
pregnancy options. Her feminist friends from the college activist circuit, however, were
not equipped to affirm her emotional ambivalence. “Because usually feminists only talk
about positive stories, I don’t think my friends were expecting there to be negative
feelings associated with [my abortion],” Andi explains. They attempt to normalize the
experience for her: “they kept saying things like “I’m not judging you” or “it’s your body,
your choice.” I know it’s my choice, but that doesn’t mean I don’t feel like shit about it
right now.” Aside from failing to address Andi’s specific emotional needs,
“normalization” suggests an emotional ideal, sending the message that low attachment to
the pregnancy is both normal and desirable.
Inadvertently, respondents may also contribute to the narrow discourse of
acceptable emotions in pro-choice circles by selectively sharing certain details of their
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experience but not others. Some variation, of course, is expected; activist Renee Bracey
Sherman (2016) reflects that someone’s story can change every time they share it because
of shifting circumstances. Nevertheless, several respondents describe how normative
expectations shape the story-telling process. Jenny, for example, did not disclose her
“negative feelings” during an abortion speak out because “it didn’t feel like it would have
been productive for the space … it wouldn’t have matched what we were all talking
about.” In other words, she believes that a “normal” abortion exists, and further assumes
that her feelings of guilt and attachment to the pregnancy make her experience an outlier.
Gina, a long time activist in the women’s movement, also perceives her abortion
as atypical. She felt hesitant to participate in the interview because she thought the
sadness and regret she experienced “might throw off [my] work.” At one point, Chelsea
even asks, “Are you getting a lot of people like me [in your sample]? In reality, the
majority of the feminist-identified people I interviewed did express some emotion that
deviated from these perceived feminist norms. Take RJ, for example. At one point, she
recalls thinking during her medication abortion, “when will this parasite be gone?” First
discovering her pregnancy, however, she felt a lot of anxiety and dread. “I tried to force it
out [by drinking] alcohol,” RJ tells me. “I remember sobbing in my room, holding my
stomach and saying I’m sorry. I think I was apologizing to myself, I was apologize to the
kid that could’ve been.” Lucy, at various points, describes her pregnancy as a “clump of
cells,” “a possible energy,” and “like a real human child to [her].” Despite this
multiplicity of experiences, however, my respondents have internalized a distinction
between normal and abnormal feelings, a distinction that enables a tiered value system
(desirable/undesirable; feminist/anti-feminist) to emerge.
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Self-Policing the Boundary Between a “Feminist” and “Anti-feminist” Abortion
My respondents work hard—often unconsciously—to create the emotions they
regard as feminist and to avoid the emotions they regard as anti-feminist. RJ, who works
with several pro-choice groups in her area, uses humor to cultivate a detached emotional
state more aligned with the belief that abortion is just another medical procedure.
Although she feels very angry before her abortion, RJ minimizes her anger when talking
to her sister by making a joke: “well if statistically one in three women get abortions,
then you [and our other sister] don’t need to worry about it.” Others work to replace socalled undesirable emotions. For Jenny, the fear of embodying an anti-feminist abortion
was palpable. After her abortion she felt conflicted, “thinking about the spirit of [her]
potential child and how [she] may have wronged it” by terminating the pregnancy. These
feelings, however, did not match her desired state of mind. “I wanted so badly to just be
happy and feel liberated,” Jenny says, “I had this guilt as a feminist for not having the
traditional story where I felt empowered. I felt guilty about being guilty!” Over the years,
Jenny has reconciled these anxieties through her activism, but at one point recalls,
“feel[ing] like I’d abandoned all my values and principles because of how I felt.”
Jenny experiences two layers of guilt. The first involves her attachment to the
pregnancy and a sense of possible loss, which she understands as an “untraditional
feminist story,” or what I call “an anti-feminist abortion.” It deviates from the norm, or
how many respondents believe they are supposed to feel. Jenny also feels what she later
calls “bad feminist guilt” because she has overstepped the boundary of appropriate
behavior: “to be totally frank, I was scared of judgment or rejection from the feminist
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movement.” She also expresses concern that having negative feelings meant that she was
letting down previous generations of feminist activists. Notice how Jenny believes that
her abortion experience has the potential to either confirm or deny her value as a feminist.
Whether or not other feminists would alienate her is a separate question. Rather, we can
say that Jenny has internalized the perceived stigma associated with negative feelings,
and fears that this stigma would also threaten her feminist identity.
Nicole also speaks to the ways in which abortion-related emotions have become a
litmus test of feminist identity. “We’re made to feel like bad feminists for having
complicated feelings after an abortion or during a pregnancy,” Nicole explains, “we’re
told that we should feel empowered by our decision and that when it doesn’t happen that
way, that there’s something wrong with us.” Again, not only are certain emotions
stigmatized but also the people who experience them. Nicole continues, recalling hushed
conversations with patients that she had as a clinic worker. “Someone might say, “Am I a
bad person if I feel sad about this?” or “I hope you don’t think I’m a bad person because
I feel complicated about this.” According to Nicole’s interpretation, patients do not feel
like bad people because they have sinned or murdered their babies, as pro-life ideology
might argue. Rather, they are self-conscious about feeling sad or complex about their
abortions, for having violated the perceived norms of pro-choice ideology.
Gina, too, sees her feminist identity at stake in the pressure to have the “right”
kind of abortion, without emotional baggage or attachment to the pregnancy. Of her
second abortion, which took place shortly after the birth of her third child, Gina says, “I
was completely crushed. I felt like I abandoned one of my children.” Her friends,
however, interpreted the abortion quite differently from Gina and were not validating her
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experience. “It’s just an abortion,” someone told her, “it’s a collection of cells.” Gina felt
dismissed: “they weren’t hearing that [the abortion] wasn’t the right thing for me.” Her
feminist friends and colleagues could not understand the depth of her sadness, so instead
pathologize Gina. “From their perspective,” Gina explains, “something must have been
wrong with me because it can’t be about the baby.” It feels like a rebuke of her feminism.
“They didn’t come out and say, this is un-feminist, but that’s what it felt like…and I get
it. I’m a feminist, and I would’ve been annoyed by me before this whole thing.”
Respondents fear that undesirable emotions undermine one’s ability to claim a feminist
identity and will diminish their credibility in the pro-choice movement.

Emotion Management in a Precarious Political Context
The broader political context also provokes emotional self-regulation. More
specifically, respondents fear that having an anti-feminist abortion experience may
threaten the precarious state of abortion rights in the U.S. Maria, for example, worries
about how “anti-abortion activists use [a person’s connection to the pregnancy] to argue
that abortion is wrong. It’s like that kids story, If You Give a Mouse a Cookie. If you give
[pro-lifers] an inch, they’ll turn it into a whole thing. Like the anti-abortion side might
use my emotional connection [to the pregnancy] to argue that abortion is wrong. They
call it Post-Abortion Syndrome or whatever.” Jenny adds:
“I feel like the feminist movement doesn’t always allow for much nuance because
the other side will have a gotcha moment. They’ll be like, “see? You regretted it,
so maybe we shouldn’t have legal abortion at all.” Even on the comments section
of an online forum, folks who are anti-choice latch on so hard to anyone who has
anything other than a positive experience as a justification for why abortion
shouldn’t be legal or should only be legal up to a certain point.”
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Embedded in the reproductive justice movement, respondents can imagine very real
consequences for overstepping the boundaries of a feminist abortion experience.
Respondents also demonstrate profound awareness of this bifurcated meaning
system when it comes to their own stories. They know that other people will interpret
their complicated abortion experiences through the more narrow categories of good/bad,
feminist/anti-feminist. Comparing her first and second abortions, for example, Frances
explains how she felt sad and overwhelmed by her first one, especially because she was
in a committed relationship at the time and also keeping the abortion secret from her
family. “It didn’t feel like Ra, Ra, Ra, my body, my choice,” Frances says, “I guess I
identified with the other guys, the first time around, the bad guys.” Frances says this with
a smile and we both laugh at the absurdity of these categories. Frances works with a
doula collective and is about as far from an anti-abortion activist as I could imagine. Yet
Frances understood the polarized categories of feminist and anti-feminist to place her
behavior under such intense scrutiny that even a bout of shame or sadness could threaten
her position as a feminist subject and turn her into “one of the bad guys.”
Concern that pro-life activists will take their experiences out of context shapes the
way that people share their abortion stories. In what would become a recurring pattern
during my interviews, someone discloses an abortion-related emotion that violates prochoice expectations and then immediately qualifies this emotion. “I started feeling
complicated about my abortion,” Maria says, “but I never regretted it, never for a
millisecond, either of my abortions.” I never asked Maria or any of my participants if
they regret their abortions, but she felt the urge to clarify and “correct” a possible
misconception that sadness or ambivalence were her primary emotional reactions.
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This rhetorical formula, disclosure followed by immediate qualification, occurs
again and again. Hermione, for example, describes her abortion as “emotionally all over
the place,” warning her husband that he would need to support her, even if she spent the
48 hours of her mifepristone/misoprostol regiment in tears. She proceeds to minimize
these emotions: “I think that has to do with the hormones.” Susan says, “I’d say that I felt
kind of depressed for a couple days and latent sadness for a few weeks after that, it was a
somber thing.” Then she quickly adds, “But I’m really OK. I didn’t have any regrets
about it, and I knew that it was the right thing to do.” Valerie discloses that she felt a
sense of anguish upon leaving the clinic, and then clarifies this statement. “Even in that
pain I never regretted [the abortion]. I was just sad this was happening to me.”
In the context of our interview, I am yet another reference group and possible
source of accountability. Having established myself as a feminist during the recruitment
process, I imagine that participants presumed that I share the dominant perspectives of
the pro-choice movement. Therefore, such “corrections” could have been meant to signal
to me, as the researcher, that they are not overstepping the boundary of a feminist
abortion experience. On the other hand, given respondents’ high levels of education, I
imagine they are familiar with the research process and the power I wield as a researcher
to present their stories to audiences both within and outside feminist circles. For this
reason, the self-policing of undesirable emotions may involve anxieties both around
feminist identity management and minimizing potential political backlash.
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CHAPTER 5
DISCUSSION
Throughout our interviews, respondents continually differentiate between
desirable or “feminist” emotions (relief, empowerment, and detachment) and undesirable
or “anti-feminist” ones (sadness and ambiguity). The pro-choice movement does not
outwardly endorse this binary, so in this section I elaborate on how these norms are
perpetuated and ultimately experienced as real. I also examine how feminist-identified
people negotiate gaps between perceived expectations and their own experiences. What
motivates someone in this situation to change their emotional state? To answer these
questions, I engage with the following concepts: feeling rules, stigma, and personal and
collective identity. Extending Hochschild’s feeling rules framework, I find that
respondents self-regulate their emotions for several reasons, in pursuit of desirable
outcomes and to avoid undesirable ones. Finally, I discuss how the perceived obligations
associated with social movement participation can impact someone’s day-to-day life.
The feeling rules framework represents one piece of this analytic puzzle. As
Hochschild suggests, my respondents observe discrepancies between their experiences
and perceived pro-choice expectations. Dylan, for instance, expresses embarrassment at
feeling ashamed when they “ought” to be feeling relieved after their abortion. Moreover,
in the case of a mismatch between feeling rules and experience, respondents engage in
emotion work to resolve this tension. For example, after disclosing sadness or another
negative emotion, they might clarify their lack of regret, contorting their emotions toward
something they perceive as more desirable.
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I propose emotional hierarchies as a complement to the feeling rules framework—
a tool, collectively, for understanding how people negotiate ideological expectations.
Respondents do not only differentiate between clusters of abortion-related emotions, but
also assign them hierarchical values, which is to say that some emotions are seen as
desirable and others carry stigma. Pro-choice abortion talk serves an instructive function,
teaching pregnant people what to expect from their own experiences and reinforcing
particular norms. While scholars have pointed out the discursive construction of a “good
abortion,” (Allen 2014; Settles & Fugerson 2015) and its impact on pregnant people’s
experiences (Keys 2010; Millar 2017), I argue that pro-choice discourse also constructs a
negative or stigmatized category, which I call an “anti-feminist abortion.” When certain
stories or emotions are absent from pro-choice discourses, my respondents believe this
sends the message that no one should feel that way, particularly feminists.
Norms “become real” through their repeated presence or absence in pro-choice
discourse. They also “become real” as respondents reproduce the hierarchy between
feminist and anti-feminist abortions, through public speech acts, private reflections, and
their own self-regulatory behavior. We cannot ignore the fact that pro-life discourses
exist and likely make intelligible respondents’ feelings of sadness or ambiguity. Chelsea,
for example, discusses both pro-life and pro-choice feeling rules. “I don’t necessarily
think of [the pregnancy] as a child,” she says, “It’s funny, I go back and forth because
there’s the Catholic guilt in me that really hates the feminist part of me.” I single out prochoice discourse, however, because people in my sample self-identify as feminists and
participate in pro-choice communities. As Keys (2010) reminds us, folks usually
internalize those messages most consistent with their ideological background.
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Moving on, in the feeling rules framework, Hochschild (1979) highlights an
important interpretive act that precedes emotion work. She argues that when someone
senses a gap between their ideal and actual emotion state, that this observation provokes
them to alter their emotions. According to this perspective, respondents pursue the
perceived norm or feeling rule, motivated by the desire to have a feminist abortion
experience. An emotional hierarchies perspective, on the other hand, sees the stigmatized
category as an equally powerful drive in this process. Respondents do not only compare
themselves against the desirable category but also against the undesirable category in
order to avoid stigma. What I call an “anti-feminist abortion,” Martin et al. (2017) refer to
as “dangertalk.” Abortion providers “perceive that the pro-choice movement requires
them to remain silent about the ethical and emotional complexities of their work.” Like
my respondents, they experience “the expectation (and burden) of self-censorship.”
But even if someone notices a mismatch between their experience and the desired
(or undesirable) feeling state, this does not guarantee emotion work. People deviate from
all kinds of social norms, so what makes feeling rules so powerful? Hochschild offers one
explanation, arguing that people manage their emotions when they feel they “owe” an
emotional debt in either a private relationship or on the labor market. I argue that
respondents’ personal and collective identities, as feminists, are key in how they
negotiate their abortion-related emotions. In particular, the theory of collective identity
helps explain why feminists feel obligated to adhere to pro-choice feeling rules, even
when neither their private relationships nor their employment status are at stake.
On one hand, feminism involves a respondent’s personal identity or sense of
self—for example, I ask Jenny, “what is a feminist?”, to which she replies, “Me. I’m a

28

feminist.” When respondents perceive a hierarchical distinction between a feminist and
anti-feminist abortion, their self-regulatory behavior constitutes both “emotion work” and
“identity work,”. Take the aforementioned pattern, where feminists disclose a negative
emotion and then immediately assert a lack of regret or that they are “really OK.” As a
form of emotion work, someone changes an emotion that is inconsistent with perceived
pro-choice feeling rules. As a form of identity work, someone negotiates how others
perceive them as a feminist and how they appraise their own identity. When they qualify
their negative emotions, this could be an appeal to say that just because they exhibit the
traits of an anti-feminist abortion, that does not make them a “bad feminist.”
Over the past century, feminists have diverged on a number of issues, including
porn and sex work (Rubin 1984), constructing a dichotomy between “good” and “bad
feminists” and a perceived mandate to police one another’s feminist identity (Gay 2014).
Due to the intensity and ubiquity of pro-choice messages about what an abortion should
feel like, abortion has become another site in which feminists have been called upon to
prove their authenticity. And whether or not feminists do experience social consequences
for having the wrong kind of abortion, many believe they will. The problem of identity
performance, however, does not belong exclusively to feminism. Societies contain a
multitude of “accountability structures” (West & Zimmerman 1987) that essentialize
difference and call upon individuals to conform to ideological norms. I argue that social
movements function as quasi-accountability structures that have the capacity to police
members through perceived (and sometimes actual) criteria.
In addition to personal identities, respondents also collectively identify as
feminists. When asked about the pro-choice movement, respondents often speak in the

29

collective voice. For example, RJ explains, “I didn’t realize how little we talk about the
abortion itself.” In this situation, “we” refers to the social movement organizations to
which she belongs. At the end of our interview, Holly argues that “we’re making progress
toward more nuanced abortion stories,” “we” being the movement itself8. Social
movement scholars argue that through the process of collective identity actors develop a
sense of mutual obligation toward one another (Polletta & Jasper 2001). This sense of
obligation associated with feminist collective identity—and respondents’ personal
identities as feminists—both incite respondents to monitor and manage their emotions.
I have argued that respondents imagine a boundary between feminist and antifeminist abortion experiences, and they fear that crossing this boundary will pose a threat
to abortion access. Although respondents have already had their abortions, they feel they
owe other people the same opportunities they have had. This commitment drives
respondents to self-police their feelings, which have come to represent far more than their
own personal experience in the court of public opinion. It also explains why some
respondents care so much that their experiences deviate from pro-choice feeling rules.
Teske (1997) and Lichterman (1996) argue that that social obligation and self-interest are
not mutually exclusive motivations to political participation. Similarly, I find that both
self-interest—in preserving one’s standing as a feminist—and social obligation—toward
collective goals and other group members—can provoke someone to change their
emotional state when it deviates from the desired norm.

8

It would be misleading to suggest that my respondents perceive or support a universal feminist
movement; after all, they offer fierce critiques of mainstream feminism’s exclusion of
marginalized voices. Even so, respondents still believe in a collective feminist project to advance
the rights and dignity of all people.
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In some ways, abortion presents a unique case of emotion management, both in
the sheer amount of abortion talk in the United States and in the degree of scrutiny
abortion encounters in other fields (such as law, medicine, religion, etc.) So how might
these findings apply to other social movement contexts? Some authors have already
discussed how different movements use feeling rules to encourage members to self-police
their emotions. Gould (2008), for example, studies the AIDS Coalition to Unleash Power
(ACT UP) and their mobilization strategies, finding that activists were often encouraged
to suppress public grief and channel it into anger. Whittier (2001) discusses how the
feminist anti-rape movement expects assault survivors to express a mixture of trauma and
resistance to “legitimize women’s claims against male violence.”
In these cases, and other cases where someone’s emotions have been politicized, I
argue that personal and collective identities are key to understanding how feeling rules
come to matter, and why someone would feel obligated to change their emotional state.
In terms of personal identity, someone might feel, for example, that their status as a
“good feminist” or “radical queer activist” would be threatened if they deviate from these
internalized feeling rules. And in terms of collective identity, we know that ACT UP is a
solidarity-based organization (Gould 2008). I imagine that members might have felt that
if they were not angry enough, then other queer people would continue to die from AIDS
and government inattention. Based on my findings on how feminists negotiate their
abortion-related emotions, I call for future research on how collective identity produces a
sense of obligation to a social movement and its members, and how this obligation
provokes emotion work at the individual and collective level.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION
Whereas we typically think of emotions as a private experience, abortion-related
emotions are often the object of public scrutiny. For example, pro-choice activists argue
that most people feel relieved after an abortion. Speaking with feminist-identified people
about their recent abortions, I noticed how uncomfortable some respondents are when
their experiences deviate from what they believe they “ought” to be feeling. I wanted to
know how these expectations are constructed and experienced as real, and how feminists
manage gaps between these perceived expectations and their own experiences. During
my interviews, I found that some respondents try to minimize or alter their “negative
emotions.” I am interested in what motivates them to do so, as well as what this case can
tell us about how social movement identification shapes emotion management.
The feeling rules framework partially explains this puzzle. Respondents, for
example, perform emotion work to make themselves feel more relieved or empowered, as
they believe the pro-choice movement demands of them. But they are also motivated by
the desire to avoid stigmatized emotions, such as sadness or attachment to the pregnancy.
In this paper, I develop an emotional hierarchies framework to account for how
respondents compare themselves against both desirable and undesirable categories.
Focusing only on people’s pursuit of an ideal emotional state, or what I call a “feminist
abortion experience,” we miss out on other aspects of emotion management, including
respondents’ avoidance of what I call an “anti-feminist abortion experience.”
I also argue that both personal and collective identities motivate someone to
change their emotional state. Feminists self-police their emotions out of self-preservation
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and collective responsibility, not necessarily out of “obligation” to loved ones or
customers, as Hochshild (1979) suggests. On one hand, knowing that their emotions will
likely be interpreted through the narrow, binary categories of good/bad, feminist/antifeminist, they regulate their emotions as a form of identity presentation—not wanting to
be labeled a “bad feminist.” On the other hand, many respondents also feel a collective
obligation to uphold abortion access for all people, and fear that pro-life activists might
misappropriate their negative emotions in order to claim that abortion is harmful.
Furthermore, I hypothesize that personal and collective identities provoke
emotion work in other social movement contexts. Because collective identity involves a
sense of mutual obligation, it produces the conditions under which someone is likely to
care whether or not their experiences match the perceived norm. This research prompts a
re-consideration of the “everyday experience,” of belonging to a social movement. For
instance, what are other ways in which the perceived obligations associated with personal
and collective identification affect members’ lives? How does social movement
participation blur the oft-contested lines between personal and private spheres?
Lastly, while I understand how the pro-choice movement can use normalizing
discourses to combat anti-abortion stigma, this can also compel feminists to feel they
need to have the “right kind of abortion.” In order to combat the pressure to have a
feminist abortion experience, my respondents offer several suggestions that might break
this hierarchy. Gina, for example, argues that a politics of non-shaming might better fit
abortion advocacy than a paradigm of normalizing vs. judgment. Whereas a normalizing
vs. judgment paradigm focuses on how someone experiences their abortion, a politics of
non-shaming redirects attention toward the behavior of other people and the forms of
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support they do or do not offer. I agree with my respondents’ critique of “normalization.”
If movement actors wish to better accommodate pregnant people’s realities, it is not
enough to expand what counts as “normal” (ie. “it’s normal for some people to feel sad or
conflicted”). This would merely shift the boundary between a feminist and anti-feminist
abortion, still assigning someone moral and political value based on their experience.
Andi argues that the pro-choice movement simply needs to expand the types of
stories they profile online and in their advocacy efforts. While it is not necessarily the
responsibility of the pro-choice movement to resolve individual feminists’ anxieties
around abortion, I do want to highlight the role of pro-choice discourse in reproducing
the emotional hierarchies that organize the way people negotiate abortion-related
feelings. Because pregnant people internalize those messages most aligned with their
political ideology, I think the pro-choice movement could be quite effective in mitigating
the perceived tension between feminists’ expectations and experiences of abortion. It is
not that abortion cannot be relieving or empowering, but for many individuals it involves
greater complexity, and as Nigerian author Chimamanda Adichie reminds us, the danger
of a single story is not that it is wrong, bur rather that it is incomplete (2006).
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